The Kalabagh Dam Consequences

The Kalabagh Dam ConsequencesThe Kalabagh block is polemic for many reasons. A profound reason has to do with the decision making process, which is highly centralized, politically coercive, and technically flawed. Regrettably, when the need is for broad- found stakeholder consultations, the existing trend is towards pull down greater centralization. For instance, the rotating chairmanship of the Indus River System means has recently been converted into a permanent appointment, provincial resolutions against Kalabagh hire been given over short shrift, the Council of Common Interests (CCI) has consistently ignored the matter and fraternity concerns hap to be met with blatant disregard. Small wonder then that the political lead in the meeker provinces and civil society be up in arms against Kalabagh.In this essay, we critically examine four contested aspects of the Kalabagh dam. These continue to wet availability environmental impacts food and free energy and technical and pecuniary feasibility. The plough of colleagues is gratefully acknowledged.Water availability is an over riding concern. Is unembellished piss available to justify the Kalabagh project? WAPDA itself the generic bug has seed confusion on this issue. It cites two average flow figures 123 MAF (million acre-feet) and 143 MAF. The number 1 unhurriedness is based on a 64- form period (1922-1996) and includes twain askew and teetotal cycles. The second prefigure is based on a much shorter and wet cycle period of 22 years (1977-1994). Since the total requirement (inclusive of the special allocation of 12 MAF under the 1991 Water Accord), is calculated at 143 MAF, in that respect is a clear short fall of 20 MAF if we intent the first estimate. This means Kalabagh may remain dry e genuinely 4 out of 5 years.Even the higher flow figure (143 MAF) overlooks certain factors. The first of these is system (evaporation and seepage) losses. If much(prenominal) losses increase d from 6.2 MAF post Mangla to 14.7 MAF post-Tarbela, presumably, they will be even higher post-Kalabagh. This would have adverse implications for inter-provincial water distri providedion. New irrigation basis appears untenable in view of these losses, since the increased upstream off-takes would be at the expense of downstream flows. This concern is also ignored when presenting Kalabagh as a replacement for Tarbela. Tarbela is projected to lose 5.3 MAF of its storage cognitive content by the year 2010. Since Kalabagh would, essentially, be replacing this loss, the Right and Left brim throw outals would divert even more of Sindhs allocations than they presently are. In addition, illegal off-takes would also tend to be exacerbated.Consider now the environmental implications of constructing yet an separate large dam on the Indus River ecosystem. A catalogue of existing degradation provides the context for future day environmental impacts of dams like Kalabagh. Degradation of the Indus delta ecosystem, as a result of decreased water outflows, is already a highly visible phenomenon. The present take of silt discharge, estimated at 100 million tons per year, is a four-fold lessening from the original level before large dams were constructed on the River Indus. The combination of salt-water attack (some reports show this as 30 km in region), and reduced silt and alimentary flows has changed the character of the delta considerably. The area of active growth of the delta has reduced from an original estimate of 2,600 sq. km (growing at 34 meters per year) to slightly 260 sq. km.The consequent ravages to the ecosystem have been exceptionally severe, in particular to the mangroves, which are its mainstay. They sustain its fisheries, act as earthy barriers against sea and storm surges, keep bank erosion in unwrap and are a source of fuel wood, timber, fodder and forest products, a refuge for wildlife and a potential source of tourism. Without mangroves and t he nutrients they recycle and the protection they provide, other components of the ecosystem would not survive.The direct and indirect benefits of mangroves are enormous. In 1988, Pakistan earned Rs.2.24 gazillion from fish exports, of which shrimps and prawns constituted 72%. extra income is generated from fuelwood, fodder and forest products was some other Rs.100/- million. Not only is this revenue at risk from mangrove loss, but the physical infrastructure required to replace the natural protection provided by the mangroves (dykes, walls) would entail enormously high capital and maintenance be.The health of mangroves is promptly linked to fresh water inflows. Releases below Kotri barrage in most(prenominal) years and excluding floods average 10 MAF. Of this, little or none genuinely r distributivelyes the mangroves. The rest is lost collect to evaporation or diversions. According to the Sindh Forestry Department, about 27 MAF is required to maintain the existing 260,000 h a. of mangroves in reasonably florid condition. This is 27 MAF more than currently available, a situation which has contributed to ecosystem instability and mangrove loss. Within the framework of the Indus Water Accord, an additional 12 MAF would be deviate for upstream dam construction including Kalabagh. This would reduce existing sub-optimal flows further and exasperate an already critical situation.A community of about 100,000 people, residing on the Yankee side of the Indus Delta, depends on the mangroves for their livelihood. The prevailing view is that cosmos under privileged, such communities are prone to degrade their environment. However, it is difficult to fathom why hapless communities should endanger the very basis of their existence. The more likely explanation is that community practices have not changed, but they appear unsustainable beca social occasion the resource base has begun to degrade. Communities are more often the victims than the agents of such degr adation are. The real culprits are water diversion biological and chemical water contamination and large-scale moneymaking(prenominal) practices, compounded both by institutional ignorance and complicity in such practices.mangrove loss is only one among the many manifestations of biodiversity deficits emerging a longsighted the stainless length of the Indus River ecosystem. The ecosystem has been severely fragmented over time by its spacious earningswork of dams, canalises and barrages, resulting in threats to a variety of species and organisms, the most notable among them be the Indus dolphin and the palla fish. Both can be classified as indicator species, as their impending loss represents the loss of a way of life, characterized by interdependence between communities and their environment.Another myth firmly embedded in the minds of our planners is that large dams are the perfect flood sustainion devices. The evidence for Pakistan shows other that its large dams not with standing, thither has been no reduction in the relative incidence and intensity of floods nor in the associated losses in lives, garbs, livestock and infrastructure. There is no seeming pattern to the floods other than the fact that they could have coincided with wet cycles. In actual fact, the severity of flood impacts appears to have increased after the two major dams, Tarbela and Mangla, were constructed.In actual fact, the shrinking of the riverbeds due to water diversions reduces their spongy capacity and hence enhances the danger of flooding. River ecosystems have a natural capacity to deal with floods and these natural processes provide many benefits. Flood plains, wetlands, backwaters are usually referred to as natures sponges they absorb and purify excess water as a hedge against lean periods. They act as spawning grounds for fish and wildfowl. The floods themselves fill again agricultural soils. Communities living around these areas adapt to this natural rhythm and us e its bounty to moderate reliable and sustainable livelihoods. It has also been pointed out that dams dont prevent floods, they merely create flood threat transfer mechanisms. The solution is to work with communities, rely on their knowledge and to supplement their flood mitigation and move strategies.Two of the most commonly cited arguments in favor of large dams consort to food security and energy. Such arguments have become increasingly stimulate in the light of perceived threats to food security and the recent frenzy surrounding the private power projects. We examine both of these arguments in turn. Additional water from Kalabagh can enhance crop production in triad ways by irrigating red-hot land by enhancing cropping intensity on existing land or through yield enhancement. The first selection appears tenuous. It is claimed that Kalabagh will irrigate close to an additional million hectares of barren land, and add Pakistan closer to wheat self-sufficiency. However, the reports of the subject area Commission on Agriculture and the National Conservation Strategy suggest otherwise. They indicate that available cultivable land is almost fully utilized, leaving little scope for extensive cultivation. in the midst of 1952 and 1977, about 80% of the increase in total cropped area was due to the cultivation of unsanded land. Since then, this proportion has fallen dramatically, with double cropping accounting for the heap of the increase. The reports suggest that in addition to the water constraint a very tangible land constraint exists as well.Crop production can also be increased through cropping intensity increases or crop yield enhancements. Both are water dependent and establish an a priori justification for Kalabagh. The NCS report states that at present 12.2 million hectares of land are available for double cropping while only 4.4 million hectares are being double cropped clear water is the constraining factor. With respect to yield enhanceme nts, water is again required in large quantities by the high manageable seed varieties (wheat, cotton, rice, maize) and for its synergetic effects upon chemical inputs.However, a critical pickaxe involve to be made here. Does one opt for additional water, or can the said(prenominal) results be achieved through improved water use efficiency? Higher water retention in the system risks exasperate an already massive problem of water logging and salinity. In fact, the controversial and exorbitantly expensive ($780 million), 25-year National Drainage Plan project has been launched to apologise its impacts. Kalabagh is bound to add to the problem, not only in its immediate surroundings but also where new irrigation infrastructure is to be situated.A clearly preferred choice is to use existing water more efficiently, and to focussing on the necessary institutional changes for its equitable diffusion. Some of the proposed measures are canal and watercourse rehabilitation, land level ing, improved on- coldm water management and, at the form _or_ system of government level, switching demand based management while protecting the needs of the poor small farmers. These are clearly win-win solutions as they are relatively low cost, efficient, equitable and environmentally friendly.After the recent commotion over private power, the government began to hype up Kalabagh as an alternative source of garish and clean energy. In the process, it switched adroitly from its earlier position that energy demand had been overstated, to one where it now posits a deficiency in supply. However, the cheap energy argument is becoming increasingly untenable both financially and technically. Donors such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank are unlikely to provide concessional funding for Kalabagh. This reflects their commitment to the thermal based private power projects, as well as the censure they have faced for getting embroiled in projects with major environmental an d resettlement costs. And even if concessional funding was available, it is still not clear that hydel unit costs would be lower than thermal, once these costs are factored in.At this point, the total debate appears to be moot since the government is scampering for funds to keep the saving afloat against the backdrop of sanctions. Even so, renewed policy statements suggest at that place is a resolve to proceed when the situation permits. Apart from the political compulsions, there is an inertial aspect to this decision as well. Institutional and financial palsy inhibits the scope for energy conservation, efficiency improvements and diversification. The options have been identified often full on the supply side these are reduction of transmission and distribution (TD) losses and renewable energy development technologies (solar, wind, biomass). On the demand side, both technical and economic options exist for energy conservation. While these have been assiduous to some extent (ta riff increases, energy efficient lighting), the efforts are a far cry from the kind of sustained initiatives launched in some South Asian countries, such as Thailand, where revamped energy supply systems are part of a larger network, with linkages to RD, the private sector and trade facilities.The title of a view Tarbela Dam Sedimentation Management, carried out by TAMS-Wallingford (March 1998) is self-explanatory. It shows that a de-silted Tarbela would yield the same irrigation benefits as Kalabagh, but at one-seventh the cost in net present value terms. The study states that, replacement of irrigation and energy benefits by constructing a new dam and reservoir down stream is feasible, but will be expensive, environmentally damaging and socially harmful. An alternative option cited is the construction of new outlets at the Tarbela Dam that will enable sediment to be red-faced from the reservoir.The proposed Tarbela Action Plan is based on computer simulations of sediment flows. These simulations were intentional to determine whether flushing was technically feasible and could be used to enhance long run storage capacity and to predict future sedimentation. Based on these simulations, a three phased action plan was proposed. The implementation of this plan would ensure long term and sustainable storage with only a small annual reduction in capacity. The estimated increase in retention at 6 MAF is exactly what the Kalabagh reservoir is designed to hold.Our conclusion is that the burden of make is on those who advocate building the Kalabagh Dam. Our findings show that it is not economically, socially or environmentally viable. Also, the proposed benefits are based on faulty or see premises and, in any case, there exist in each case more viable and cost effective alternatives.